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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY: 
 
In this thesis, I analyze why some listed companies in Finland have recently chosen to carry 
out their IPOs with dual-class share structures and why some companies have chosen to 
unify their share classes into a single class. I also analyze the presence of common 
characteristics amongst companies that have chosen to retain a dual-class share structure.  
 
Earlier research on dual-class share structures has concentrated mostly on the economic 
consequences of having such a structure. A few studies exist, however, in which the 
correlation between different company characteristics and the existence of dual-class share 
structures have been analyzed. In this paper, the findings from the existing body of 
research are utilized in framing assumptions for creating, retaining and discarding dual-
class share structures. Most of the existing studies have been carried out with data gathered 
from the U.S. market. Dual-class share structures are relatively common in Finland, and 
there appears to be a gap in literature when it comes to understanding the reasons for why 
such structures exist in abundance in Finland. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA: 
 
The research method is explanatory, aiming to understand whether a causal relationship 
exists between dual-class share structures and selected company characteristics using 
quantitative, statistical regression analysis. Additionally, qualitative analysis is used to 
support the analysis of reasons behind the creation and unification of dual-class share 
structures. The data consists of all publicly listed companies on Nasdaq Helsinki OMX, 
including companies traded on the alternative market, First North Helsinki. Furthermore, 
the data includes prospectuses, public announcements and corporate legal documents of 
selected companies. 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY: 
 
Finnish companies that have recently chosen to carry out their IPOs with dual-class share 
structures have not given any justification for such a choice. The main reasons to unify 
share classes into a single class are clarification of ownership structure, increasing public 
interest towards the company's share and improving the liquidity of shares. Larger 
companies, companies with some other anti-takeover provisions in their Articles of 
Association and companies operating in the health care or consumer goods business tend 
to have dual-class share structures more often than other companies. Within technology 
companies, dual-class share structures are rare.  
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TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITEET 
 
Analysoin tässä tutkimuksessa sitä, miksi jotkin suomalaiset listatut yhtiöt ovat 
viimeaikoina päättäneet toteuttaa listautumisensa käyttäen useampaa osakesarjaa sekä 
sitä, miksi jotkin yhtiöt ovat päättäneet yhdistää osakesarjansa yhdeksi osakesarjaksi. 
Analysoin lisäksi sellaisten yhtiöiden yhteisiä piirteitä, jotka ovat päättäneet säilyttää kaksi 
osakesarjaansa.    
 
Aiempi tutkimus osakesarjoista on keskittynyt enimmäkseen osakesarjojen taloudellisiin 
vaikutuksiin. Muutamassa tutkimuksessa on kuitenkin tutkittu erilaisten 
yhtiöominaisuuksien sekä kahden osakesarjan olemassaolon korrelaatiota. Tässä 
tutkimuksessa aiemman tutkimuksen löydöksiä hyödynnetään muodostaessa 
taustaoletuksia osakesarjojen eriyttämisestä, säilyttämisestä ja yhdistämisestä. Suurin osa 
olemassa olevista tutkimuksista on tehty Yhdysvaltain markkinoilta kerätyllä aineistolla. 
Kahden osakesarjan rakenteet ovat melko yleisiä Suomessa, ja tutkimuksessa vaikuttaa 
olevan aukko sen osalta, miksi tällaisia rakenteita esiintyy runsaasti Suomessa.   
 
TUTKIMUSMETODI JA LÄHDEAINEISTO 
 
Tutkimusmetodi on selittävä ja tarkoituksena on ymmärtää, onko kahden osakesarjan 
olemassaolon ja valikoitujen yhtiöominaisuuksien välillä syy-seuraus -suhdetta käyttäen 
hyväksi määrällistä tutkimusta, tilastollista regressioanalyysia. Lisäksi laadullista 
tutkimusta hyödynnetään analysoitaessa syitä osakesarjojen eriyttämiselle sekä 
yhdistämiselle. Lähdeaineisto koostuu kaikista Nasdaq Helsinki OMX:ssä listatuista 
yhtiöistä mukaan lukien yhtiöt, jotka ovat kaupankäynnin kohteena vaihtoehtoisella 
markkinapaikalla, Fisrt North Helsinki -markkinapaikalla. Lisäksi lähdeaineisto sisältää 
valikoitujen yhtiöiden listaeleottoesitteitä, julkisia tiedotteita sekä yhtiöoikeudellisia 
dokumentteja.   
 
TUTKIMUKSEN TULOKSET 
 
Suomalaiset yhtiöt, jotka ovat viime vuosina päättäneet toteuttaa listautumisensa kahdella 
osakesarjalla, eivät ole antaneet perusteluja valinnoilleen. Pääasialliset syyt osakesarjojen 
yhdistämiselle ovat olleet omistusrakenteen selkeyttäminen, yleisön kiinnostuksen 
lisääminen osaketta kohtaan sekä osakkeen likviditeetin parantaminen. Isommilla 
yhtiöillä, yhtiöillä, joilla on yhtiöjärjestyksissään yritysvalatuksia torjuvia mekanismeja 
sekä yhtiöillä, jotka toimivat terveydenhuolto tai kuluttajatuote -toimialoilla on yleisimmin 
kaksi osakesarjaa. Teknologia yhtiöissä osakesarjat ovat harvinaisia.     
 
Avainsanat  corporate governance, kahden osakesarjan listautumiset, osakesarjat, 
omistaja-arvo 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“A dual-class stock structure, which carries unequal voting rights, is 
antithetical to the fair and fundamental principle of a ‘one-share, one-vote’ 
system and has no place in today’s marketplace. Control of a corporation 
should come from owning a majority of shares, not owning special shares 
with special rights.” 
-William D. Crist, former president of CalPERS Board of Administration1 
The early 2000's were grey periods of corporate scandals, including Enron (2001), 
WorldCom (2002), Freddie Mac (2003) and American Insurance Group (2005), after 
which corporate governance has been a hot topic in the financial community (Bauer & al. 
20042). Even though a lot of steps have been taken to improve corporate governance 
regulation and practices worldwide, we are not yet in a completely regulated world and it is 
assumable that new regulation in the field of corporate governance will be introduced. In 
Europe, for instance, the MiFID II directive, including corporate governance elements such 
as new requirements for management bodies of investment firms, entered into force on 2 
July 2014, and must be implemented by the member states by 3 January 2017 (MiFID II 
Directive).   
This paper discusses dual-class share structures, which can be seen as a material part of the 
corporate governance discussion. As Crist strongly states above, dual-class share structures 
carry an inherent moral dilemma in terms of fair and equal ownership. Is he right or 
wrong? To what extent is the structure problematic, and why? To understand those 
questions, we must start from the beginning.   
A dual-class share structure – what is it all about? Are mechanisms that separate voting 
rights from cash flow rights good or bad from the shareholders' and the company's 
perspective? Why are dual-class share structures created? Why have some companies 
chosen to abandon such structures? This paper seeks to answer these questions. 
                                                 
1 Business Wire, Sacramento, CA, April 21, 1999, “CalPERS Announces Investment Opinion on Nine of 
Corporate America’s Poorest Financial and Economic Performers” (Li & al. 2008) 
2 Refers only to the previous incomplete sentence. 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
1.1.1 What is a Dual-Class Share Structure?  
The term dual-class share structure means that a firm has more than one share class with 
different rights, usually voting rights, attached to them.3 In a typical dual-class share 
structure, insiders hold shares with multiple votes per share when the public receives 
shares with only one vote per share (Seligman 1986). It is also possible that shares issued 
to the public do not have any voting power. A characteristic feature of dual-class share 
structures is that they allow shareholders to achieve a controlling position by investing 
disproportionally low share of capital (Pajuste 2005).   
A dual-class share structure can be seen as a control enhancing mechanism that does not 
follow the proportionality principle (one share –one vote). A control enhancing mechanism 
is a way for a shareholder or group of shareholders to maintain control of a company, even 
though such a shareholder or group holds only a small proportion of the shares. Other such 
mechanisms available under Finnish law are  
(i) pyramid structures, where a shareholder gains control via indirect ownership in 
multiple company structures; 
(ii) voting right ceilings, where no shareholder can vote over a certain limit;  
(iii) super-majority provisions, allowing certain decisions to be made only with a 
consensus from a high number of votes;  
(iv) cross share holdings, that create control in companies via shared ownership 
structures between two firms; and  
(v) shareholder agreements, which allow the pooling of votes.  
Compared to other European Union member states, the use of control enhancing 
mechanisms in Finland is on an average level. While on the European level a pyramid 
structure is the most common control enhancing mechanism, in Finland there are no 
                                                 
3 For the sake of clarity, in this paper the term "dual-class" also includes multi-class structures where there 
are three or more share classes. However, among Finnish publicly listed companies there are no companies 
with multi-class structures, except First North companies Cleantech Invest and Fit Biotech, which have three 
and four share classes respectively.  
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identified pyramid structures and a dual-class share structure is the most common control 
enhancing mechanism. (ISS & al. 2006) 
1.1.2 Why is the Topic Current? 
Throughout the 1990s, the markets faced a trend where dual-class companies unified their 
share structures back into a single class (Amoako-Adu & Smith 2001). A similar trend can 
be seen in the Finnish market as well (see section 4.3 below). Researchers have identified 
that a major reason for the trend was an increased academic and public interest in corporate 
governance (Pajuste 2005).   
However, in 2004, a new wave of dual-class share initial public offerings ("IPOs") began 
when Google adopted a dual-class share structure for its IPO. After Google's IPO, inter 
alia, the following companies have chosen to execute their IPOs with dual-class share 
structures: LinkedIn, Groupon, Yelp, Zynga and last but not least, Chinese online retailer 
Alibaba4 with the largest IPO ever made.5  
When it comes to Alibaba's IPO, which took place in March 2014, a noteworthy point is 
the choice of the stock exchange. Instead of a listing in Hong Kong, which representatives 
of Alibaba thought of as the natural first choice, Alibaba chose to enter on the New York 
stock exchange. The main reason for the choice of marketplace was that Alibaba has a 
dual-class equity structure under which the founding partners have a right to nominate the 
majority of the board members in perpetuity. Such dual-class share structures are not 
allowed on the Hong Kong stock exchange.6 
Losing Alibaba's IPO was a huge setback for the Hong Kong stock exchange, and this 
incidence led to a lengthy debate over whether the stock exchange should allow dual-class 
shares and other weighted-voting structures. In this debate Hong Kong’s regulator, the 
Securities and Futures Commission objected the proposed structures. During the debate, 
                                                 
4 More specific, instead of normal dual-class share structure, Alibaba has a partnership which consists of 
founders of the company. The partnership elects the majority of board members. This structure can only be 
changed, if 95% of the shareholders votes to change it. (Alibaba's prospectus). For the sake of simplicity, in 
this paper, Alibaba's structure is considered as a dual-class share structure.   
5 Forbes. Alibaba Claims Title for Largest Global IPO Ever with Extra Share Sales, 22 September 2014. 
Electronically available at: http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2014/09/22/alibaba-claims-title-for-largest-
global-ipo-ever-with-extra-share-sales/, referred on 18 September 2015.  
6 The Wall Street Journal. How Hong Kong Lost the Alibaba IPO, 15 March 2014. Electronically available 
at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303546204579440820673013810, referred on 19 
September 2015.  
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market consultations were carried out and large international investors, such as BlackRock 
and Fidelity, were also against the proposed disproportional structures. Just recently (5 
October 2015), the Hong Kong stock exchange gave up on the idea of letting companies 
sell shares with different voting rights. As David Webb, an investor and governance 
activist based in Hong Kong pointed out, "Corporate governance was already bad enough 
without making it even easier to abuse minority shareholders".7  
As huge international technology companies are adopting dual-class share structures one 
after another, and the world's sixth largest stock exchange8 was considering amending its 
rules due to this recent dual-class trend, the topic can be deemed to be current. Also, an 
interesting, although to some extent speculative, question is whether this global trend could 
enter or has already entered the Finnish market as well.  
1.2 Objective of the Study and Research Questions 
There is quite a lot of research in the field of dual-class share structures. However, most 
research papers focus on the economic performance of dual-class firms following their 
IPOs or the unification of share classes, answering the question of whether dual-class share 
structures are beneficial or not to the shareholders of dual-class firms. There are fewer 
studies focusing on reasons why companies choose to adopt dual-class share structures in 
the first place and retain such structures later.  
To showcase a few examples of the latter mentioned, less common body of research, 
Amoako-Adu & Smith (2001) have studied IPOs of companies listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange in order to find company characteristics that indicate a tendency for preferring 
dual-class share structures. Pajuste (2005) and Maury & Pajuste (2011) researched the 
reasons why firms in continental Europe are unifying their shares into a single-class. 
Arugaslan & al. (2010) have studied why firms deviate from a one share – one vote 
                                                 
7 The Wall Street Journal. Hong Kong Exchange Considers Rule Change on Dual-Class Shares, 19 June 
2015. Electronically available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/hong-kong-exchange-considers-rule-change-
on-dual-class-shares-1434714290, referred on 19 September 2015. & Financial Times. Hong Kong exchange 
gives up on dual-class share plan, 5 October 2015. Electronically available at 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0bc597ee-6b42-11e5-aca9-d87542bf8673.html#axzz3oS4r5aJc, referred on 
10 October 2015.   
8 Wikipedia. List of Stock Exchanges. Electronically available at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_stock_exchanges, referred on 18 October 2015.  
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principle when going public. Furthermore, Chemmanur & Jiao (2012) analyzed the types 
of firms where dual-class share structures are prevalent.  
In Finland, 35 companies out of 140 publicly listed companies9 have dual-class share 
structures and nine of the companies that have such structures have listed both share 
classes. Even though dual-class share structures are relatively common in Finland, there 
appears to be a gap in literature when it comes to understanding the reasons for why such 
structures exist in Finnish companies. Consequently, this paper tries to fill the gap, and the 
key research questions of this paper are as follows:  
(i) Based on previous research, do dual-class share structures increase or destroy 
shareholder value? 
(ii) Under Finnish law, what are the practical consequences of having a dual-class 
share structure? 
(iii) Why have publicly listed companies in Finland chosen to create dual-class 
share structures? 
(iv) What common characteristics do publicly listed companies in Finland with 
dual-class share structures have? 
(v) Why have publicly listed companies in Finland chosen to unify their former 
dual-class share structures into a single-class? 
In light of the research questions, the question of whether dual-class share structures 
enhance or destroy the shareholder value in publicly listed companies in Finland and if so, 
to what extent, is scoped out of this paper. However, taking into account the previous 
literature, introduced in section 2.2 below, it appears quite evident that dual-class share 
structures have a harmful effect on the shareholder value also in the Finnish market.    
To answer the research questions, I analyze all publicly listed companies on Nasdaq 
Helsinki OMX and try to find common characteristics of dual-class firms. Additionally, I 
                                                 
9 The status is as per 6 October 2015.  In this paper, publicly listed companies also include companies traded 
on the First North alternative market. After the said date, Evli Bank Plc has announced its IPO on the main 
list which will be carried with two share classes, consequently, the current number of publicly listed 
companies is 141, out of which 36 have a dual-class share structure. Evli Bank Plc has not been taken into 
account in the data of this paper.  
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evaluate if the identified common characteristics are consistent with the frameworks 
formed in previous literature on dual-class shares. I also review relevant prospectuses in 
order to analyze reasons why dual-class share structures have been recently adopted. 
Furthermore, regulation plays a crucial role when evaluating practical consequences of 
disproportional structures. Therefore, I will conduct a limited legal research on 
developments and a current state of affairs of Finnish company and securities market laws.  
1.3 Research Method  
The research method is empirical and explanatory10, meaning in this context that a 
framework for expected advantages and disadvantages of adopting dual-class shares is 
synthesized from existing literature and initially compared to public statements of dual-
class companies to see whether they align. Additionally, a binary choice regression 
analysis is run on Finnish publicly listed companies to see whether further evidence of 
correlation exists.  
In addition to data consisting of a complete sample of all Finnish publicly listed 
companies, I have reviewed prospectuses, other corporate documents and releases of 
companies that have recently chosen either to adopt a dual-class share structure or to unify 
their share classes into a single class. The research combines a quantitative analysis of 
statistical correlation behind advantages and disadvantages of dual-class share structures 
with a qualitative analysis of whether the found correlations align with public statements. 
The objective is to find reasons for dual-class share structures – not to analyze economical 
effects of disproportional ownership structures.  
1.4 Structure of the Study 
The structure of the research begins with an introduction to the background and 
motivation of the research, followed by the research question and objectives of the study. 
The introduction is followed by a synthesis of existing literature in chapter 2, especially 
focusing on advantages and disadvantages of dual-class share structures and common 
characteristics of the companies that choose to have a dual-class share structure.  
                                                 
10 Wikipedia. Causal research. Electronically available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_research, 
referred on 18 October 2015. 
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As it is important to understand the Finnish legal framework when evaluating dual-class 
share structures in Finland, the third chapter introduces the said framework and its most 
important developments. 
The fourth chapter goes on to analyze why some Finnish companies have recently chosen 
to carry out their IPOs with a dual-class share structure, common characteristics of the 
Finnish publicly listed companies that have chosen to retain a dual-class share structure, 
and why some Finnish publicly listed companies have chosen to unify their share 
structures into a single class. Also, the data used in analysis is presented in section 4. 
Finally, the conclusions of findings, as well as practical implications and suggestions for 
further research are presented in section 5.  
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2 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DUAL-CLASS SHARE 
STRUCTURES – LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, different views on dual-class share structures are presented. The chapter 
begins with an introduction to the topic on a general level, after which more specific 
research findings concerning dual-class share structures is presented. Previous literature 
has concentrated extensively on research regarding possible advantages and disadvantages 
of disproportional structures and this chapter aims to summarize those findings. 
2.1 Advantages of Dual-Class Share Structures 
As discussed briefly above, dual-class share structures are quite common, especially in 
certain countries and dual-class IPOs can be deemed to have experienced a renaissance in 
global technology IPOs. Consequently, it can be assumed that creating dual-class share 
structures is expected to result in some benefits for the shareholders or the company. 
The idea of a corporate structure is that it allows separation of ownership from 
management. However, this does not come without costs. As shareholders' agenda differs 
from the management's agenda, there are always agency costs involved in a corporate 
structure. (Monks & Minow 2004, pages 9 and 98) Furthermore, as Easterbrook and 
Fischel (1983) point out, deviating from the "one share – one vote" principle creates 
additional and unnecessary agency costs.  
When it comes to corporate governance and increased agency costs derived from a dual-
class share structure, the concept of private benefits needs to be introduced. One of the 
main premises in modern financial theory is that the ownership of listed companies is 
diversified and that shareholders should receive benefit pro rata to their shareholdings 
(Barclay & Holderness 1989). However, according to the data (section 4.2.2) in many 
Finnish publicly listed companies the ownership is actually centralized, and particularly, in 
dual-class companies the voting power is extremely concentrated on average. Such control 
structures may easily lead to monetary gains derived by controlling shareholders at the cost 
of minority shareholders, and such gains are called private benefits11.   
                                                 
11 BusinessDictionary.com. Private Benefits. Electronically available at: 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/private-benefits.html, referred on 25 October 2015. 
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To conclude, the holders of superior voting shares are able to gain private benefits by way 
of a dual-class share structure which can be monetary or non-monetary in nature. However, 
when considering benefits from the perspective of this paper, I define benefits as 
maximizing shareholder value, i.e, creating a dual-class share structure needs to be 
beneficial so that the market capitalization of the company is maximized in the longer, or 
at least in the shorter, run.12     
2.1.1 Benefit of Insider Control 
Generally, supporters of dual-class and other disproportional structures claim that such 
structures enable the management to govern with minimal outside interference and focus 
on long-term growth which would ultimately enhance the shareholder value (IRRC 
Institute & ISS 2012). As Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg expressed it, when replying to 
Om Malik, the founder of Gigaom13:  
"The more power you have as a CEO, the easier it is for you to do what you 
think is right and ignore people pushing for shorter term interests. Similarly, 
if you have control of the company, then it is very difficult for investors to fire 
you. This means you don’t need to worry about losing your job over a couple 
of bad quarters or controversial short term decisions, and that makes it 
easier for you to make the decisions you think are correct as well.” 
The quote above crystallizes the idea that structures protecting management from outside 
threats are beneficial for all shareholders. However, as will be discussed below, this 
common benefit argument for dual-class shares may not hold.  
According to DeAngelo & DeAngelo (1985), companies with a dual-class share structure 
can be viewed as compromises between dispersed owned public corporations and   closely-
held firms, as a dual-class share structure enables managers to hold majority voting rights 
when outside shareholders hold majority cash flow rights. Such dual-class share structures 
are most common in situations where there are certain benefits in managerial ownership 
                                                 
12 More precisely, being economically well-grounded, a value of private benefits derived from a dual-class 
share structure should be more than the loss derived from such a structure. However, defining the private 
benefits, especially when they are non-monetary in their nature, is very complicated. Therefore, in this paper, 
only those benefits of dual-class share structures that enhance the shareholder value are taken into account.   
13 Fortune. Here's how Mark Zuckerberg keeps Facebook's investors in check, 2 July 2015. Electronically 
available at: http://fortune.com/2015/07/02/mark-zuckerberg-investors/, referred on 15 October 2015. 
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(e.g., by encouraging managerial investment in firm-specific human capital) and 
simultaneously external equity capital is needed in order to carry out attractive 
investments. The logic here appears to be that even though a dual-class share structure is 
not optimal, it may enable investments that would not be made, if an option to carry out the 
IPO with a dual-class share structure was not available.  
Fischel (1987) points out that there are certain situations in which insider control may be 
beneficial for all of the shareholders. Namely, insiders may value control more than 
outsiders, which leads to a higher value for the company (also after a possible discount 
derived from a dual-class share structure, see section 2.2.2 below). Fischel (ibid.) also 
points out that insider control may lead to a higher price in a possible takeover process, as 
there is a strong counterparty to the offeror.  
According to Fischel (1987), value of insider control itself is not an adequate reason for a 
dual-class share structure, as insiders could hold more than 50% of the outstanding equity 
and retain a single-share structure. Therefore, the value of insider control needs to be 
combined with circumstances in which insiders cannot hold the majority of the outstanding 
equity. Certainly, insiders may simply lack the personal wealth to hold a majority of the 
outstanding equity. It is also possible that outsiders, who are in a better position to 
diversify their entire risk, are able to bear the risk at lower cost than insiders who already 
have a large stake in their company (Fama & Jensen 1983).   
2.1.2 Benefit of Significant Abnormal Returns 
When studying a sample of 178 firms that changed from a single-share structure into a 
dual-class share structure during 1979–1998, Dimitrov & Jain (2006) found that these 
dual-class recapitalizations were shareholder value enhancing actions, as shareholders 
earned significant abnormal returns following recapitalizations. On average, in the 4-year 
period following the announcements, the sample firms outperformed the matching 
portfolios by 23.11%.  
However, Dimitrov & Jain (2006) also found that the increased shareholder value was 
based on the profitable growth of the sample firms, which suggests that the firms with 
anticipated valuable growth opportunities adopted dual-class share structures. 
Consequently, it appears that rather than a causal relationship between the dual-class 
recapitalizations and the increased shareholder value there has been another independent 
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variable (a lucrative investment opportunity) for these dependent variables (adopting a 
dual-class share structure and abnormal returns).  
2.1.3 Benefit of Board Stability 
In order to take a closer look at recent dual-class share structure based IPO activity, I also 
reviewed prospectuses of Alibaba, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Groupon, Yelp and Zynga 
in order to find well-grounded reasons for why said companies chose dual-class share 
structures. Facebook, Groupon and Yelp gave no justifications, whatsoever, for their share 
structure choices in their prospectuses (Prospectuses of Facebook, Groupon and Yelp).  
On the other front, LinkedIn and Zynga have word-for-word similar justifications, where 
they state that chosen structures are intended to improve the stability in the composition of 
Boards of Directors and their policies (Prospectuses of LinkedIn and Zynga). Alibaba has 
quite a complex partnership structure which elects the majority of board members. In its 
prospectus, Alibaba highlights that the partnership, unlike the normal dual-class share 
structure, is a dynamic body which ensures excellence, innovation and sustainability and 
has helped Alibaba to better manage their business (Prospectus of Alibaba). 
Aforementioned arguments can be considered to include, to some extent, statements that 
dual-class share structures are seen as enhancing shareholder value in these cases.   
There may be an interesting connection between the additional need for board stability, 
subsequent dual-class share structures and current market trends. During recent years, at 
least in international practice, we have seen the number of activist investors rise. An 
activist investor is a shareholder or a group of shareholders using its (relatively small) 
equity stake in a public company to put public pressure on the company's management in 
order to enhance the shareholder value14. Such investors are criticized for emphasizing the 
company's short-term goals over long-term success. As Laurence Fink, chief executive of 
BlackRock Inc., the world’s largest money manager, argued, in order to respond to 
requests of activist investors, companies are taking more and more measures that deliver 
immediate payouts for shareholders, such as dividend increases and buybacks. 
Simultaneously, companies compromise investments that would maximize the long-term 
                                                 
14 Wikipedia. Activist Shareholder. Electronically available at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Activist_shareholder, referred on 14 November 2015. 
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shareholder value, such as R&D and investments in production facilities.15 Scott Fisher, a 
U.S. lawyer and a partner in the New York office of Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg 
LLP, pointed out that dual-class share structures have became more common again, as 
such structures are used to protect companies from activist investors.16 A stable board is 
also at least theoretically able to make more stable, long-term decisions.  
2.1.4 Non-Monetary Private Benefits  
Google has the most extensive and interesting justification for a dual-class share structure 
in which they highlight, in addition to corporate benefits, non-monetary private benefits 
(nature of the information as public good). Google has also explicitly stated that there is an 
indirect, causal effect between a dual-class share structure and increased value to the 
shareholders. Below is a quotation from Google's prospectus:    
"We have a world class management team impassioned by Google’s mission 
and responsible for Google’s success. We believe the stability afforded by the 
dual-class structure will enable us to retain our unique culture and continue 
to attract and retain talented people who are Google’s life blood. Our 
colleagues will be able to trust that they themselves and their labors of hard 
work, love and creativity will be well cared for by a company focused on 
stability and the long term.  
--- 
When Sergey and I founded Google, we hoped, but did not expect, it would 
reach its current size and influence. Our intense and enduring interest was to 
objectively help people find information efficiently. We also believed that 
searching and organizing all the world’s information was an unusually 
important task that should be carried out by a company that is trustworthy 
and interested in the public good. We believe a well functioning society 
should have abundant, free and unbiased access to high quality information. 
                                                 
15 The Wall Street Journal. As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend More on Buybacks Than Factories, 26 May 
2015. Electronically available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-
shareholders-1432693805, referred on 2 November 2015.  
16 Financial Post. From Cara Operations Ltd to Shopify Inc: Why dual class shares are suddenly cool again, 
5 May 2015. Electronically available at: http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/from-cara-to-
google-why-dual-class-shares-are-suddenly-cool-again, referred on 2 November 2015.  
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Google therefore has a responsibility to the world. The dual-class structure 
helps ensure that this responsibility is met. We believe that fulfilling this 
responsibility will deliver increased value to our shareholders."     
A noteworthy point in the Google's justification is that they emphasize the society and 
employees as important stakeholders that they are responsible towards, and fulfilling their 
responsibilities towards these stakeholders will enhance shareholder value as well.  
The fact that Google has a dual class-share structure and has issued such strong justification is 
in line with a finding made by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) according to which non-
monetary private benefits of control may be high in media-related firms and hence may tempt 
founders to create a dual-class share structure. 
2.2 Disadvantages of Dual-Class Share Structures 
So far, we have focused on benefits of dual-class share structures, however, there is also 
the other side of the coin which we will take a look at below.  
2.2.1 Principal-Agent Problems and Private Benefits 
As already pointed out, generally, dual-class share structures create increased principal-
agent problems between those who make decision (holders of superior voting shares) and 
those who bear the consequences (holders of common shares) and enable the first 
mentioned group to gain private benefits at the cost of the latter mentioned group 
(Grossman & Hart, 1988). Such agency costs, associated with disproportional structures, 
such as dual-class shares, increase exponentially as the fraction of cash flow rights held by 
holders of superior voting shares declines (Bebchuk & al. 2000). More specific economical 
consequences of principal-agent costs derived from dual-class share structures have been 
discussed below.  
2.2.2 Shareholder Value  
Bennedsen & Meisner Nielsen (2008) researched the effect of disproportional ownership 
structures on firm values in Europe. They found that such disproportional structures have a 
large negative effect on firm value and dual-class share structures have an even larger 
effect than other disproportional structures, such as pyramid ownership structures, cross 
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ownership, golden shares17 and voting caps so that the firm value of an average European 
firm with dual-class shares is approximately 19 percent lower than a firm with a 
proportional ownership structure. This finding can be deemed to be in line with a finding 
that dual-class firms trade at lower price-to-earnings ratios than single-class firms (Smart 
& Zutter 2003). These finding also hold in Scandinavia. When analyzing the effect of anti-
takeover mechanisms on the firm value using a data including publicly listed Nordic 
companies, Ikäheimo & al. (2011) found that such provisions, especially dual-class shares 
have a negative effect on the firm value.   
IRRC Institute & ISS (2012) researched performance of controlled firms in the S&P 1500 
Composite, i.e., firms with a majority shareholder holding more than 30% of the votes in 
the company. Most of these controlled companies featured multiclass capital structures. It 
was found that non‐controlled firms outperform controlled firms over a 10‐year period and 
controlled companies with multi-class equity structure only outperformed over a one year 
period, and materially underperformed over longer periods of time. It was also found that 
controlled companies with multi-class equity structures consistently show materially more 
share price volatility than non-controlled companies, whereas, the share price of controlled 
single-share companies was less volatile than the share price of non-controlled companies. 
(ibid.). This finding, especially, means that the usual argument for dual-class share 
structures of enhancing long-term value does not hold.   
When analyzing dual-class firms in the United States and the relationship between insider 
ownership and firm value, Gompers & al. (2010) found that firm value is increasing in 
insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in insider voting rights. In other words, the more 
insiders own superior voting shares, the more firm value is decreasing. An explanation for 
this correlation appears to be that such an asymmetry in insider voting and cash flow right 
results in increased private benefit at cost of holders of common shares. When studying 
dual-class companies in the United States, Masulis & al. (2007) found that the bigger the 
gap is between insiders' cash flow rights and control rights, the more private benefits result 
and the less an extra dollar is worth to outside shareholders.  
                                                 
17 A type of share that gives its holder veto power over certain resolutions. Such a share is often held by a 
government organization (Investopedia. Golden Share. Electronically available at: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/goldenshare.asp, referred on 16 October 2015).   
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2.2.3 Investor's View 
Li & al. (2008) researched whether voting rights affect investment decision of institutional 
investors. They found that compared to single-class firms, institutional ownership in firms 
with a dual-class equity structure is substantially lower, a result that holds for all types of 
institutions. In addition, the institutions substantially increased their ownership following 
the unification of the dual-class equity structure.  
More specific, when researching financial institutions' views18 on disproportional 
structures, ISS & al. (2006) found that depending on the type of disproportional structure, 
from 58% to 92% of investors take into account existence of a possible disproportional 
structure, when considering the investment. From all disproportional ownership structures, 
dual-class share structures have the largest impact on the financial institutions' view. 
Furthermore, 80% of institutional investors considered that there should be a discount on 
the share price of companies with disproportional structures, and such discount ranged 
from 10% to 30%. (ibid.). The investors' view on the required discount can be considered 
to be in line with findings presented above, according to which companies with 
disproportional ownership structures are trading at a lower value than companies with 
proportional ownership structures.      
2.3 Conclusions on Dual-Class Share Structures  
As discussed above, consequences of dual-class equity structures on shareholder value are 
large. Firms with dual-class equity structures are trading at a lower value than single-share 
firms, they are providing worse returns to investors and their stock price is more volatile 
than single-share firms'. In addition, “smart” money (as evidenced by institutional 
investors) avoids investing in dual-class equity structure firms. 
It appears that there are more arguments against than ones advocating for the benefits of 
dual-class share structures.  It also appears that most of the companies that have chosen a 
dual-class equity structure cannot justify such a choice. In light of this, it is not surprising 
that John J. Pehlan in 1986, a chairman of NYSE back then, stated (Monks & Minow 2004, 
page 123):  
                                                 
18 World widely, 445 institutional investors, managing more than EUR 4.9 trillion in assets, participated in a 
survey. 
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"The one share, one vote rule (which was then applicable in NYSE) is good 
for listed companies, good for the shareholders, and good for the country."  
A noteworthy matter from the perspective of this paper is that efficiency losses derived 
from dual-class share structures are highlighted in Europe compared to the United States. 
In Europe, the ownership of companies is usually concentrated while in the United States it 
is dispersed, and the regulations against self-dealing have traditionally been stricter in the 
United States (Enriques & Volpin 2007).   
To summarize, the literature review highlights certain key advantages and disadvantages of 
dual-class share structures. The advantages stated in research from the perspective of 
shareholder value maximization are: 
(i) insider control, i.e., benefits from managerial ownership are enabled, while 
enabling simultaneous raising of external equity capital which may have a 
positive effect on shareholder value in some specific circumstances;  
(ii) abnormal returns as evidenced in some studies which argument is questionable; 
and 
(iii) non-monetary private benefits for the public good, e.g., information online in 
media-related industries. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages stated in research from the perspective of shareholder 
value maximization are: 
(i) increased principal-agent problems and the cost of private benefits;  
(ii) loss of shareholder value in the long-term; and  
(iii) lack of institutional investors investing in disproportional structures. 
To conclude, the disadvantages of dual-class share structures seem to outweigh the 
advantages, as shareholder value is lost in the long-term (except for a number of 
exceptional cases of abnormal returns). 
Notwithstanding the aforesaid, many companies in Finland still have a dual-class share 
structure and several IPOs have also been carried out with a dual-class equity structure 
during the recent years. Could there be other reasons for these dual-class share structures? 
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3 LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN FINLAND REGARDING THE DUAL-CLASS SHARES 
In the early 1990s, superior voting shares on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (currently 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki) traded on average at 100% higher value than common shares 
(Löyttyniemi 1992). Currently, no such price difference exists. On the contrary, more 
liquid shares with inferior voting rights trade at a higher price in many cases. One major 
reason behind the disappearance of price differences can be found from developments in 
regulation, especially, regulation relating to corporate governance.   
In this chapter, I seek answers to what practical consequences dual-class share structures 
have under Finnish law. Since many Finnish publicly listed companies have adopted their 
current dual-class share structures long ago, it is essential to understand the developments 
in regulation when evaluating the necessity of such structures today. Therefore, we need to 
take a brief look at relevant Finnish legislation and a recent history.  
The European Commission has made an extensive effort to harmonize European company 
law, and so far altogether 13 company law directives have been imposed and implemented 
by the member states. The developments discussed below have been driven by the 
implementation of the directives.     
3.1 Finnish Company Law and its Implications 
3.1.1 Decision Making in a Finnish Limited Liability Company 
“A man without a vote is a man without protection.” 
-Lyndon B. Johnson (36th U.S. President) 
When passing resolutions in Finnish limited liability companies (including public 
companies) the main rules under the Finnish Companies Act ("CA") are as follows:  
(i) a decision by the shareholders' meeting requires a simple majority of all votes 
cast (CA: 5:26); and 
(ii) certain more material decisions (such as the amendment of the Articles of 
Association, a directed share issue, the acquisition and redemption of own 
shares in a public company, a merger, and a demerger) require 2/3 of the votes 
cast and the shares represented at the shareholders’ meeting (CA:5:27). 
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In light of the above, it appears that the holders of superior voting shares are able to pass 
resolutions that may not be optimal from the minority shareholders' point of view, and 
thus, gain private benefits at the cost of other shareholders. However, during two recent 
decades, there have been material efforts to improve corporate governance standards in 
European Union and in Finland, and certain rules, which limit the rights of holders of 
superior voting shares, have been imposed.  
In 1997, the Finnish Companies Act was amended so that in a company with different 
share classes, two-thirds majority is required in every share class for certain important 
corporate decisions (such as a merger, a demerger and the directed acquisition of own 
shares) (Pajuste 2005). Simultaneously, the equality of shareholders was highlighted, the 
minority shareholders' protection was strengthened and the liability of the Board of 
Directors was made stricter (Government proposal 89/1996).  An essential argument for 
such changes is that if there were no protective measures for minority shareholders against 
malpractices of the majority shareholder, attractiveness to invest into companies would 
decrease materially (Savela 2010). 
In 2003, Board of the Securities Market Association issued the Corporate Governance 
Recommendation for Listed Companies (which was later replaced by the Corporate 
Governance Code, issued by the Board of the Securities Market Association). The code is 
based on self-regulation imposed by the Board of the Securities Market Association and 
the aim of the code is that Finnish publicly listed companies apply corporate governance 
practices which represent high international standards. Furthermore, the code should 
improve the transparency of processes of publicly listed companies, as well as harmonize 
the practices of publicly listed companies. The current code came into effect in 2010. (The 
Corporate Governance 2010)   
Furthermore, a new Companies Act, which came into effect in 2006, imposes certain rules 
and principles which aim to further the equality of the shareholders. First, the current law 
contains an explicit principle of equality of shareholders under which a shareholders' 
meeting, the Board of Directors or the management cannot take any decision that would 
unduly favor a shareholder or third party to the detriment of the company or another 
shareholder (CA:1:7). Second, a general explicit principle, under which the management of 
the company shall act with due care and promote the interests of the company, was 
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introduced in the current Companies Act (CA:1:8). In the government proposal for a new 
Companies Act, it has been highlighted that it is not allowed for a board member to act 
only for direct benefits of a specific shareholder or a group of shareholders, not even when 
the board or a member of the board has been appointed by such shareholder or a group of 
shareholders (Government proposal 109/2005). Third, when it comes to a liability of the 
management, the current Companies Act is stricter than the previous one, as solely a 
breach of the aforementioned general principle suffices to trigger a liability of the 
management towards the company (CA:22:1).   
Consequently, as minority shareholders are currently better protected against malpractices 
of the majority shareholder and the board is under a highlighted obligation to further the 
corporate benefit (even when the board members are appointed by the majority 
shareholder), the majority shareholder is not able to gain benefits from the company at the 
cost of minority shareholders to that extent as it was previously possible.   
The development in Finland can be considered to be in line with the finding that in 
countries with strong legal and regulatory frameworks, dual-class share structures and 
other disproportional share structures make less of a difference to investors, as 
shareholders holding superior voting shares are able to gain less private benefit than in 
poorly regulated countries (OECD 2007). 
3.1.2 Takeover and Squeeze-Out  
"You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that 
cannot be attacked.” 
-Sun Tzu, approximately 2,500 years ago 
Hostile takeovers are usually profitable for shareholders of a target company. However, as 
a hostile takeover may result in a displacement of the management, there may be a conflict 
of interest between shareholders and the management. Dual-class share structures are such 
anti-takeover measures that provide insiders with the possibility to consolidate control and 
protect them from hostile takeovers. (Jarrell & Poulsen 1988) 
When it comes to hostile takeovers, an essential question is whether the bidder is able to 
complete the takeover. In practice, an offeror will not launch an offer, if it is clear that the 
offeror will not be able to purchase all of the shares in the target. When analyzing, whether 
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an offeror has an opportunity to purchase all of the shares in the target, squeeze-out rules 
under the Companies Act play a crucial role.  
Under the Finnish Companies Act, a shareholder holding more than 90% of the shares and 
votes of a company has the right and, at the request of a minority shareholder, the 
obligation to redeem the remaining shares (CA:18:1). Consequently, complete control over 
the target is achieved when the offeror is able to exceed aforementioned thresholds, and 
therefore, public tender offers are usually subject to achieving the thresholds. 
Should there be superior voting shares in the target company, which the offeror has not 
succeeded to purchase through a tender offer (or separately as market purchases), the 
offeror may face insurmountable challenges to complete the deal. Given the superior 
voting structures actually used in Finland giving their holder 20 votes per share, a 
shareholder holding only 0.5% of the shares in the company may hold 10% of the votes, 
and consequently, prevent a hostile takeover. 
Until 2006, the Finnish Companies Act restricted that the number of votes carried by a 
share may not be more than 20 times the number of votes carried by another share. 
However, the current Companies Act does not include such a restriction and the current 
law also allows shares with no voting power at all. So far, we have not, however, seen 
more extreme structures in Finnish publicly listed companies than 1 to 20 voting ratios, 
except on First North traded Cleantech Invest which has issued a share-class giving no 
votes to holders of such shares.  
As discussed in section 3.1.1 above, changes in legislation have dramatically restricted 
possibilities of holders of superior voting shares to gain private benefits at cost of minority 
shareholders which have been reflected in prices of such shares. However, a takeover 
attempt can be prevented with a relatively small portion of superior voting shares. Thus, 
one could argue that dual-class share structures have primarily been retained as anti-
takeover measures in order to prevent hostile takeovers.   
The finding that dual class share structures are positively and significantly related to the 
takeover premium and negatively and significantly related to the likelihood of a takeover 
made by Holmén & al. (undated) is in line with the above-mentioned.  
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3.2 13th Company Law Directive 
As discussed above, significance of superior voting shares have dramatically decreased 
when it comes to the decision making, however, they have retained their position as anti-
takeover measures. A function of dual-class share structures as anti-takeover measures was 
threatened, however, as will be discussed below.    
Possibly one of the most controversial directive proposals ever made by the European 
Commission is a proposal for the 13th company law directive concerning takeovers. The 
objective of the directive was to impose integrated rules for takeover offers on publicly 
listed companies within the European Union, which would further an objective of member 
states to transform the European Union into the most competitive market of the World 
(Winter 2004). 
A preparation of the Takeover Directive was started in 1974 and after several drafts, the 
European Council reached a political compromise on the directive in 2000 (Hopt 2002). 
However, the European Parliament voted “no” to the draft, as certain member states 
considered that the draft did not adequately tackle issues concerning takeover defenses. 
Consequently, the European Commission nominated the High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts, chaired by Mr. Jaap Winter (the "Winter Group"), to solve this issue (ibid.). 
In January 2001, the Winter Group released its preliminary report. The report contained a 
debate-provoking breakthrough rule, under which an offeror who, through a takeover offer, 
obtains a shareholding representing at least 75 percent of the equity in the target company, 
would no longer be bound by restrictions set forth in the Articles of Association of the 
target at the first general meeting of the target company following disclosure of the offer 
(Winter & al. 2002A). The proposed break-through rule would have broken through voting 
caps, multiple voting rights and other defenses against takeovers (Hopt 2002). In other 
words, at the general meeting following disclosure of the offer, one share – one vote 
principle would have applied. Under Finnish law, the result would have been that the 
offeror achieving 90% of the shares would have been able to execute a squeeze-out 
process.    
However, the proposed break-trough rule faced opposition from Finland, Norway and 
Sweden. First, these countries considered that the rule would limit the companies' right to 
determine their own capital structure. Second, Sweden argued that dual-class share 
 27 
structures are beneficial for corporate governance, as they enhance the shareholders’ active 
ownership (monitoring) in companies that are so large that they need to raise equity from 
the market. Third, the Nordic countries considered that the breakthrough rule is based on a 
theoretically incorrect view of defensive measures, as the basic problem is possible 
defensive measures by the Board of Directors after the announcement of the offer without 
approval by the shareholders. On the contrary, the breakthrough rule would have weakened 
shareholder influence, as structures created by the shareholders would have bypassed. 
Fourth, Sweden emphasized that there was no empirical support behind the proposal, as 
takeover activity in Sweden is higher than in most European countries and there was no 
evidence of takeover activity being adversely affected by the existence of dual-class share 
structures. Last, the Nordic countries argued that the proposed breakthrough rule would 
have violated property rights of holders of superior voting shares. (Skog 2004) 
As Winter put it, the negotiations between the member states, following the release of the 
preliminary report, showed a true nature of the discussion. Even though the objective was 
to remove defenses against takeovers, many of the member states were willing to ensure 
that companies residing in their regime would not become subject to successful takeover 
offers. (Winter 2004) 
Due to a heavy lobbying of the Nordic countries, the final report of the Winter Group did 
not mention the breakthrough rule (Winter & al. 2002B). The Takeover Directive ended up 
in the form that member states may choose whether they apply the breakthrough rule under 
article 11 of said directive (article 12 of the Takeover Directive).   
In 2012, the European Commission published a report reviewing the application of the 
Takeover Directive by the member states. Generally, the European Commission considered 
that the existing regime is satisfactory, however, certain developments may be needed in 
order to further improve the protection of minority shareholders. When it comes to the 
breakthrough rule, only three member states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have 
implemented the rule in their legislations. However, the commission considered that at this 
stage the breakthrough rule will not be made mandatory. (The European Commission's 
Report on Application of the Takeover Directive) 
In conclusion, dual-class share structures are effective measures to prevent hostile 
takeovers and it appears that this will be the case also in the future.  
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3.3 Conclusions on the Legal Framework of Dual-Class Share Structures  
In this chapter, the aim was to seek answers to the practical consequences that dual-class 
share structures have for companies under Finnish law. First, when looking at Finnish 
company law, it is seen that holders of superior voting shares are able to pass through 
resolutions via a simple majority of voting rights. However, when studying the 
developments and recent legal practice more closely, it is evident that the influence of 
disproportionate structures on decision making is avidly being mitigated. Second, the 
review highlights a clear conclusion that dual-class share structures are able to be used as 
effective anti-takeover measures against hostile takeovers. In reference to the discussion on 
the 13th Company Law Directive, this feature of the structure is widely acknowledged.  
To conclude, although section 2 concluded on the fact that dual-class share structures 
lower the long-term shareholder value of companies and lead to principal-agent problems 
as well as fail to attract institutional investors, there were also advantages highlighted that 
benefit companies in specific situations, namely where management wants to retain control 
or the nature of the business is tied to public good. The legal framework adds another 
advantage to this conclusion, showing that these structures have their place as effective 
anti-takeover measures. 
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4 WHY DO DUAL-CLASS SHARE STRUCTURES EXIST IN FINLAND  
As described in section 1.2, dual-class share structures are common among Finnish 
publicly listed companies (35 out of 140 publicly listed companies, i.e., 25 percent of listed 
companies; or 36 out of 141, if Evli Bank Plc is taken into account). However, these 
structures have been even more common, and in the end of 1995, 30 out of 65, i.e., 45.5% 
publicly listed companies in Finland had a dual-class share structure (45.5%) (Pajuste 
2005).  
Considering what has been discussed in section 2.2 about value destroying effects of dual-
class share structures, except in certain specific cases, and the fact that 25 percent of the 
Finnish publicly listed companies still have different share classes, it can be assumed that 
there are some relevant, specific and well-grounded reasons to adopt and retain such equity 
structures. In this chapter, possible reasons behind dual-class share structures are analyzed. 
The analysis is three-part:  
(i) section 4.1 focuses on reasons why some companies have recently chosen to 
carry out their IPOs with dual-class share structures;  
(ii) section 4.2 looks at possible common characteristics of dual-class companies in 
order to explain why some companies retain a dual-class share structure; and  
(iii) section 4.3 studies why certain Finnish publicly listed companies have chosen 
to unify their share classes into a single-class.  
Based on the analysis in sections 2 and 3, it is assumed that the retention of dual-class 
share structures, and on the other hand the decisions on unification are based on the 
identified advantages and disadvantages of dual-class share structures.  
4.1 Recent Dual-Class IPOs in Finland  
The latest dual-class IPO on the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki main list took place in 2009, when 
Aktia carried out its IPO (if the non-completed IPO of Evli Bank is not taken into account). 
However, during recent years, there have been a few dual-class IPOs on the First North list 
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in Finland19. In order to find reasons behind the choices to carry out these IPOs with dual-
class share structures, I reviewed prospectuses of Aktia, Evli Bank and the First North 
companies. In prospectuses, dual-class share structures are objectively described and only 
flagged as risk factors. However, as was the case also with some of foreign companies, 
discussed in sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above, none of the Finnish companies that have 
recently chosen to carry out its IPO with a dual-class share structure has given any 
background or justifications for such a choice (Prospectuses of Aktia, Evli Bank, 
Taaleritehdas, Cleantech Invest, United Bankers, Savo-Solar and Fit Biotech). 
It can be considered strange that none of the aforementioned companies have given any 
justifications for their dual-class share structures. This may be a speculative view, but I 
assume that Finnish investors do not require justifications, as they are less sophisticated 
than, e.g., the U.S investors. This can be explained by the fact that there is no tradition of 
retirement savings in stocks in Finland, compared to other countries. Furthermore, dual-
class share structures have always been very common on the Finnish stock market, and 
therefore it may be that these structures are tolerated as they are and have not been 
questioned.   
One noteworthy point is that when it comes to Fit Biotech and Savo-Solar, different share 
classes have identical dividend and voting rights, and the only difference between share 
classes is liquidation preferences attached to certain share classes. This means that in case 
of liquidation, holders of shares with a liquidation preference are higher at the pecking 
order. The liquidation preferences are based on earlier financial rounds of these companies, 
thus, these structures differ from those dual-class share structures which have been 
willfully created just prior to the IPO. Furthermore, all of the B-shares of Savo-Solar were 
converted into A-shares, in connection with the IPO.  
4.2 Current Dual-Class Share Structures 
As no reasons for dual-class share structures have been stated in the prospectuses of recent 
IPOs, perhaps, by analyzing companies that have a dual-class share structure and the 
characters of such companies, we are able to find patterns in the types of companies that 
                                                 
19 Taaleritehdas in 2013, Cleantech Invest and United Bankers in 2014 and Savo-Solar and Fit Biotech in 
2015. 
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are more likely to deviate from the one share – one vote principle. Therefore, I chose to run 
a regression analysis as described below.    
4.2.1 Methodology and Variables 
In order to analyze possible common factors and characteristics behind current dual-class 
share structures, a binary choice logit model and linear probability model regression 
analyses are constructed and tested on a complete sample of all Finnish publicly listed 
companies. The objective is to explain the dependent variable that takes only two values; 
one if the company currently has a dual-class share structure (SCSS) and zero if the 
company has a single-class share structure. The logit regression model is expressed as 
follows:  
Ln (PrDCSS/(1-PrDCSS)) = β0 + β1(Vintage) + β2(Cap) + β3(IBM) + β4(ICG) + β5(ICS) + β6(IFIN) 
+ β7(IHC) + β8(ITE) + β9(ATM) + β10(CSH) + uj 
and respectively, the linear probability model is as follows: 
PrDCSS = β0 + β1(Vintage) + β2(Cap) + β3(IBM) + β4(ICG) + β5(ICS) + β6(IFIN) + β7(IHC) + 
β8(ITE) + β9(ATM) + β10(CSH) + uj 
where PrDCSS is a probability of a dual-class share structure for a company, Vintage refers 
to how long ago a company was listed, Cap is a market capitalization of a company, IBM  is 
a industry dummy variable for basic materials companies, other industry dummy variables 
being: ICG = consumer goods, ICS = consumer services, IFIN = financials, IHC = health care 
and  ITE = technology, ATM is a dummy variable for possible anti-takeover provisions in 
the Articles of Association of a company and CSH is a dummy variable for a potential 
controlling shareholder holding more than 30% of the votes in a company. Explanatory 
variables and their assumed correlations between the response variable will be defined in 
more detail below.   
Vintage – A vintage of the company refers to how many years ago a company was listed. 
Dual-class share structures are considered to be temporary structures which are deployed in 
situations where simultaneously outside equity is needed and management is willing to 
hold control over the company (DeAngelo & DeAngelo 1985 and Amoako-Adu & Smith 
2001). In light of this, dual-class share structures should be more common within newly 
listed companies than those companies that have been listed a long time ago, i.e., a 
 32 
negative correlation between the vintage and existence of a dual-class share structure 
would be expected.  
Cap – An assumed correlation between a market capitalization and existence of dual class 
shares is not clear. A small size of a firm increases the likelihood of a firm's probability of 
becoming a takeover target (Palepu 1986 and Comment & Schwert 1995). Amoako-Adu & 
Smith (2001) claim that as dual-class share structures are effective anti-takeover measures, 
smaller firms should utilize such structures more commonly. However, Comment & 
Schwert (1995) find that the correlation between a firm's size and the likelihood that the 
firm is having a poison pill in its Articles of Association is actually positive. Consequently, 
an assumption, whether a correlation between a market capitalization and a likelihood of 
dual-class share structure is positive or negative, cannot be drawn.     
Industry – Certain researchers suggest that industry of a company may have an effect on 
whether such a company has a dual-class share structure. The logic behind this is that the 
non-monetary private benefits of control may be high in some industries and hence may 
induce founders to establish a dual-class share structure (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1985). 
For instance, Gompers & al. (2010) find that companies operating in the media industry 
have more commonly a dual-class share structure than companies in other industries. 
Consequently, a purpose of the industry dummy is to find possible industries in which non-
monetary private benefits of control are high and a likelihood of dual-class share structures 
is higher. Unfortunately, there are only a few media companies on Nasdaq Helsinki OMX, 
and therefore it is not possible to test a media dummy in this paper.      
There are altogether seven different industries; a reference category is industrials and 
dummy variables are as defined above. Industries defined by the stock exchange were used 
with following exemptions: in order to eliminate categories Fortum has been considered as 
an industrial company (instead of utilities), Neste Oil and Savo-Solar have also been 
considered as industrial companies (instead of oil and gas) and Elisa and TeliaSonera have 
been considered as technology companies (instead of telecommunications). 
Anti-Takeover Mechanism (ATM) – In addition to dual-class share structures, certain 
Finnish listed companies have some other provisions in their Articles of Association that, 
in practice, serve as anti-takeover mechanisms. The following provisions can be 
considered as such mechanisms:  
 33 
(i) capped voting provision under which a number of votes that can be cast by a 
single shareholder assuring that voting power will be widely dispersed (Gilson 
1996); 
(ii) mandatory offer provision (so called poison pill) under which a shareholder 
whose holding exceeds a threshold set forth in the Articles of Association is 
obliged to redeem the rest of the shares in the company (Pönkä 2008)20; and 
(iii) staggered board provision under which the board’s term of office lasts longer 
than one year which make a takeover more difficult (Ikäheimo & al. 2011).21 
Even though anti-takeover provisions discussed above may partly be unenforceable, such 
provisions represent a purpose to prevent hostile takeovers. Therefore, it is interesting to 
analyze whether companies tend to rely on only one anti-takeover mechanism or if there is 
a tendency to use both a belt and suspenders so that in addition to a dual-class share 
structure some other anti-takeover mechanisms are used. When researching a database 
consisting of more than 3,000 U.S. firms, Ganor (2014) found that there is a positive 
correlation between dual-class share structures and staggered boards. Under U.S. law, 
dual-class share structures and staggered boards are each considered as an entrenchment 
mechanism sufficient by itself to prevent hostile takeovers, therefore, the correlation is 
somewhat surprising (ibid.). Based on a generalization, an assumption is that there is a 
positive correlation between dual-class share structures and other anti-takeover 
mechanisms.  
Controlling Shareholder (CSH) – Last but not least, a dummy indicating whether a 
company has a controlling shareholder was added. A company, person, management or 
family holding more than 30% of the votes in the company is considered as a controlling 
shareholder in this paper. As it can be deemed that there is a causal relation between a 
dual-class share structure and the existence of a controlling shareholder, a strong positive 
                                                 
20 It is questionable whether mandatory offer provisions are enforceable under Finnish law (Pönkä 2008). 
Furthermore, in 2006, the Securities Market Act was amended so that a threshold for a mandatory takeover 
offer was lowered to a level (30% of the shares or the votes) which was already a market practice with 
Articles of Association of listed companies and as a consequence of this, poison pills practically lost their 
significance, when it comes to publicly listed companies.  
21 Staggered board provisions are very rare in Finland. In addition, pursuant to the Companies Act, a board 
member may be dismissed ahead of term by the party who appointed the member, consequently, a staggered 
board provision is unenforceable under Finnish law.  
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correlation can be assumed. However, the dummy variable was added in order to confirm 
that the companies with dual-class share structures have actually controlling shareholders – 
if this was not the case, it would be clear that these structures would not serve their 
purpose. CSH has a value of one if the company has a controlling shareholder and zero if 
there is no such shareholder.  
The threshold of 30% for the control was chosen, since it is indirectly stated in the 
government proposal for amending the Securities Market Act that, given dispersed 
ownership structure of most of the publicly listed companies, a holder of 30% of the votes 
has factual control over the company (Government proposal 6/2006). Consequently, it is 
logical to apply the same threshold in this paper, when considering if a shareholder or a 
group of shareholders has factual control over the company.  
Above, I have identified five different explanatory variables which may have an effect on 
whether the company has a dual-class share structure. The hypotheses and variables are 
summarized in table 1 below. The expected sign of each variable shows whether a 
likelihood of a dual class share structure is expected to go up (+) or down (-) together with 
that variable.     
Table 1. Summary of Dual-class Likelihood Hypotheses and Explanatory Variables 
Hypothesis    Name  Meaning Variable  Expected Sign  
Age Hypothesis  Vintage How many years ago was the company listed Years - 
Size hypothesis  Cap  Market capitalization of the company  M€ +/- 
Industry 
hypothesis 
Industry 
dummies  
What is the company's industry industrials 
being the reference group 
Industry dummy ? 
Anti-takeover 
hypothesis  
ATM Does the company have other anti-takeover 
provisions in its Articles of Association  
ATM dummy + 
Control 
hypothesis 
CSH Does the company have a controlling 
shareholder holding more than 30% of the 
votes 
CSH dummy + 
4.2.2 Data  
The data consists of all the publicly listed companies in Finland, including companies with 
shares traded on the First North market place. As the Evli Bank's IPO was not completed 
on the date of this research, Evli Banks has been excluded from the data. The data on 
whether a company has a dual-class share structure was gathered by reviewing the Articles 
of Association of each company, possible controlling shareholders were identified from the 
website of each company and the relevant stock market data was gathered from websites of 
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Nasdaq OMX (nasdaqomxnordic.com) and Kauppalehti (kauppalehti.fi). The data is as per 
30 September 2015, except market capitalizations and vintages which are as per 6 October 
2015. 
As a general comment, the number of Finnish publicly listed companies is relatively small, 
thus, it is difficult to make statistically significant findings. However, the sample is a 
complete sample of the selected scope of the research.   
The data can be summarized as follows: 
Table 2. Summary of the Dataa 
Variable Scale Observations  Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
DCSS Dummy (0;1) 35 0.25 0.43 - - 
Vintage  Years 140 16.50      11.47    0.25    73.50 
Cap   MEUR 140 1686.17     5277.64        1.86    42888.99 
IBM Dummy (0;1) 12 0.09     0.28 - - 
ICG Dummy (0;1) 14 0.1     0.30 - - 
ICS Dummy (0;1) 14 0.1     0.30 - - 
IFIN Dummy (0;1) 18 0.13     0.34           - - 
IHC Dummy (0;1) 9 0.06    0.25           - - 
ITE Dummy (0;1) 22 0.16    0.37           - - 
ATM Dummy (0;1) 18 0.13     0.34           - - 
Industrials  Ref. group 33 - - - - 
CSH Dummy (0;1) 48 0.34     0.48           - - 
aThis table shows scales of variables the Cap being millions of euros, the Vintage being years and other variables being 
dummy variables which can take only two values; either one or zero. The table also shows the number (Observations) and 
percentage (Mean) of firms including in each category, except in categories the Vintage and Cap mean shows average 
vintage of listed companies and average market capitalization of listed companies, respectively. Also, minimum and 
maximum values have been shown in categories, where applicable.  
4.2.3 Results  
Table 3 below presents the results of binary choice regression analyses which were run as a 
linear probability model (LPM) and logit model (Logit). Both models are seeking an 
answer to the question, “What company characteristics explain a choice to have a dual-
class share structure?”  Despite of some serious defects of the LPM, such as problems with 
the disturbance terms and predicted probabilities less than zero or higher than one with 
extreme x-values (Dougherty 2007, pages 292-294), I chose to run the LPM, in addition to 
the Logit, as the first mentioned is easier to interpret. As the number of observations is 
relatively small, I also chose to run logit model regression without industry dummies and 
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test whether this has any effect on statistical significance of correlations between other 
explanatory variables and the explained variable.   
Table 3. Regression Analysis on Factors affecting the likelihood of Dual-Class Share Structureb 
Independent 
Variable     
Exp. sign  LPM                         
(t-value) 
LOGIT                        
(z-value) 
LOGIT                                         
(without industry dummy)           
(z-value) 
Constant  0.005                  
(0.06)    
-2.851                                     
(-4.52)***    
-2.390                                            
(-5.10)***    
Vintage  - 0.004    
(1.34)    
0.027    
(1.39)    
0.025    
(1.41) 
Cap   +/- 0.000013    
(1.95)* 
0.0000986    
(1.61)    
0.0000609    
(1.72)* 
IBM ? 0.129    
(0.99)    
0.841  
(0.98)    
- 
ICG ? 0.217 
(1.73)*    
1.037    
(1.43)    
- 
ICS ? 0.057    
(0.47)    
0.354    
(0.47)    
- 
IFIN ? 0.170    
(1.54)    
0.987    
(1.46)    
- 
IHC ? 0.307 
(2.05)**       
1.717    
(1.96)**    
- 
ITE ? -0.177    
(-1.68)*    
Omitted  - 
ATM + 0.196    
(1.75)*    
1.397     
(1.84)*    
1.138    
(1.89)*    
CSH + 0.217    
(2.86)***    
1.397  
(2.76)***      
1.364    
(3.04)*** 
Number of firms  140 (df=129) 118 140 
bThis table shows the results of  linear probability and logit analyses of the existence of dual-class share structures on 
Nasdaq Helsinki OMX. The explanatory variables that have explained above in section 4.2.1 have been presented in the 
left column. The expected sign shows an expected correlation between the explained variable and the explanatory 
variable. The table also shows coefficients for explanatory variables, as well as, t- and z-values which are in brackets. In 
the table, * corresponds to significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; and *** significant at 1%. 
 
As discussed above, it is controversial whether the correlation between the size of a 
company and the probability of the company to have a dual-class share structure is 
assumed to be positive or negative. Theoretically one would expect to see less dual-class 
share structures within large companies, as such companies are less likely to be taken over. 
However, the trade practice in the United States does not support this theory. On Helsinki 
Nasdaq OMX, the larger a company is, the more likely it is to have a dual-class share 
structure (the finding is significant on a 10% level in the LPM and the Logit when it has 
been run without industry dummies).  
When it comes to the industry dummy, health care companies and companies providing 
consumer goods tend to have dual-class share structures (health care is significant at the 
5% level in both regressions and consumer goods industry is significant at the 10% level in 
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the LPM) more often than companies in the reference group. Contrary, within technology 
companies dual-class share structures are statistically (at the 10% level) less common than 
in companies in the reference group (in the Logit, the technology industry dummy is 
omitted, as there are no dual-class technology companies on Nasdaq Helsinki OMX). 
As is the case with the market capitalization of a company, it is rather unclear what kind of 
correlation is assumable between the existence of anti-takeover provisions and a dual-class 
share structure. In theory, it should be either a dual-class share structure or some other anti-
takeover provision, but in practice, it appears to be both. In light of the aforementioned, an 
interesting finding is that there is a positive and statistically significant (at the 10% level in 
all the regressions) correlation between a company having a dual-class share structure and 
some other anti-takeover mechanism, as well. This does not appear to be logical.   
Even though this is not a statistically significant finding, correlation between the vintage of 
a company and likelihood of company having a dual-class share structure appears to be 
against the theory that has been discussed in section 4.2.1 above. As dual-class share 
structures should be temporary structures which are deployed when a company is 
transforming from a private company into a genuine public company. Nevertheless, there 
is slight evidence that on Nasdaq Helsinki OMX companies that have been listed a long 
time ago tend to have a dual-class share structure more often than more recently listed 
companies.  
Finally, as anticipated, there is a strong and significant (significant on a 1% level in all the 
regressions) correlation between the existence of a controlling shareholder and a dual-class 
share structure. As discussed previously, any other finding here would have been 
surprising.   
4.3 Unifications of Share Classes in Finland 
Solely in 2000's, there have been several unifications of share classes on Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki (see table 4 below). The starting point in each case has been that the common 
share has had one vote and the superior voting share 10 or 20 votes each. In a few cases, 
there have also been minor differences between financial rights of share classes, but 
generally, other rights of the share classes have been the same.   
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4.3.1 How is Unification Carried Out? 
An established way to carry out the unification of share classes is to direct a gratuitous 
share issue to holders of superior voting shares in some proportion to their holding of such 
shares in connection with the unification. During the recent years, the amount of such 
compensation shares has varied from 5% to 25%22 of the shares held by the shareholders of 
superior voting shares. A clear trend has been that the number of compensation shares have 
decreased, which is in line with the fact that differences in share prices have diminished as 
well.  
The unification itself is carried out by amending the Articles of Association of a company 
so that a provision concerning different share classes is removed. Under the Finnish 
Companies Act, a proposal to unify share classes need to be supported by at least two 
thirds (qualified majority) within each of the share classes represented at the meeting, in 
addition, consent obtained from the majority within each share class whose rights are to be 
reduced is required (CA:5:27 and 5:28). A noteworthy point here is that a possible 
premium which is paid to holders of superior voting shares has to be simultaneously large 
enough to incentivize holders of superior voting shares to give away their control power 
and small enough to be reasonable from a perspective of holders of common shares so that 
their ownership is not being diluted too much. Under the Companies Act, there is no 
obligation to provide any compensation for holders of superior voting shares in connection 
with the unification of share classes.  
Oriola's attempt to unify its share classes in 2014 provides a real life example of the above 
described balancing under the Companies Act. Certain shareholders of Oriola, representing 
together 12.14% of the shares and 16.39% of the votes, demanded that a proposal to unify 
the share classes (and to issue compensation shares) is added to the agenda of the Annual 
General Meeting, held on 24 March 2014. One compensation share was proposed to be 
issued against 14 A-shares, in connection with the unification. Each Oriola's A-share has 
20 votes and each B-share has one share. An exceptional feature in this case was that an 
                                                 
22 In Efore's and Hackman's cases amounts of compensation shares were even higher, however, in Efore's 
case the unification was carried out in connection with a larger reorganization and in neither of cases were 
compensation shares issued gratuitously. Therefore, the cases are not completely comparable. (Table 4) 
 39 
initiative to unify share classes came from shareholders, not from the Board of Directors, 
as it is the case usually. (The minutes of the Annual General Meeting) 
In the Annual General Meeting, the proposal was, however, rejected. A qualified majority 
(two thirds) of the B-shares represented in the meeting voted for the proposal, but such a 
support was not met within holders of A-shares. Consequently, it appears that the proposed 
compensation (1 compensation share per 14 A-shares) was not adequate for holders of A-
shares. On the other hand only 74% of the holders of B-shares voted for the proposal, and 
it may be that the threshold of two thirds would not have been exceeded, if the amount of 
compensation shares had been much higher. Furthermore, there was also a technical 
difficulty, as the consent (as referred above) from the majority of holders of A-shares had 
not been obtained. (Ibid.). 
4.3.2 Reasons for Unifications of Share Classes 
As discussed above, there have been several unifications of share classes on Nasdaq 
Helsinki OMX in 2000's. Table 4 below presents the unifications (prospectuses and stock 
exchange release of companies listed in table 4).  
Table 4. Unifications of Share Classes in 2000'sc 
Company  Unification 
Year 
Share Classes Compensation Shares Reasons for Unification  
Norvestia 2015 A-shares: 10 votes; 
B-shares: 1 vote 
No compensation 
shares 
Clarify the ownership structure; interest 
towards the share; liquidity; acquisition 
of financing 
Yleiselektroniikka 2012 K-shares: 10 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
Calculative premium 
of 10%  
Unification in connection with a merger; 
no stated reasons 
Vaahto Group  2010 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
2 per 25 K-shares Clarify the ownership structure; interest 
towards the share; liquidity; acquisition 
of financing 
Elcoteq 2010 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
No compensation 
shares 
Unification was based on the conversion 
clause; no stated reasons 
Tamfelt 2009 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 4 K-shares No information available 
Fiskars 2009 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 5 K-shares Clarify the ownership structure; interest 
towards the share; liquidity; 
transparency 
Wärtsilä  2008 A-shares: 10 votes; 
B-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 9 A-shares General trend; clarify the ownership 
structure; interest towards the share; 
liquidity 
Panostaja 2008 A-shares: 20 votes; 
B-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 13 A-shares Interest towards the share; liquidity; use 
of share consideration in transactions 
Julius Tallberg-
Kiinteistöt 
2007 A-shares: 20 votes; 
B-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 10 A-shares Simplify and clarify the ownership 
structure; interest towards the share; use 
of share consideration in transactions 
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Pohjois-Karjalan 
Kirjapaino  
2007 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 19 A-shares Simplify and clarify the ownership 
structure; interest towards the share; 
liquidity; acquisition of financing; use of 
share consideration in transactions 
Sanoma  2006 A-shares: 20 votes; 
B-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 10 A-shares Simplify and clarify the ownership 
structure; trend in Finland and globally; 
interest towards the share; liquidity; 
acquisition of financing 
Efore 2004 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 2 A-shares 
(compensation share 
was not gratuitous) 
Simplify and clarify the ownership 
structure; international practice; 
liquidity; acquisition of financing 
Pohjola 2002 A-shares: 10 votes; 
B-shares: 1 vote 
No information 
available 
No information available 
Hackman 2002 K-shares: 20 votes; 
A-shares: 1 vote  
1 per 2 K-shares 
(compensation share 
was not gratuitous) 
No information available 
cThis table shows unifications of share classes carried out on Nasdaq OMX Helsinki in 200's. The starting point prior to the 
unification is presented in the centermost column and number of compensation shares directed to the holders of superior 
voting shares is presented under the title "Compensation Shares". The reasons that a company in question has stated in 
connection with the unification are present in the right column.    
 
When it comes to reasons behind the unifications, an interesting point is that all the 
companies that have explicitly stated reasons for the unification have stated quite similar 
reasons. Such common reasons for the unification of the share classes include the 
following:  
(i) publicly listed companies are increasingly switching to one share class in 
Finland an abroad; 
(ii) it will clarify (and simplify) the company’s ownership structure;  
(iii) it is expected to add interest towards the company’s shares;  
(iv) it is expected to increase the amount of liquidity associated with the share 
capital;  
(v) it will improve the company's possibilities for use of the company’s shares in 
the acquisition of financing (and as a share consideration in acquisitions); and 
(vi) it will increase transparency.    
In conclusion, it appears that the main drivers behind the unifications have been an aim to 
improve corporate governance, increase the firm's share value and further a possibility to 
raise equity financing. When analyzing dual-class unifications of firms located in 
continental Europe, Pajuste (2005) found that unifications of dual-class shares are carried 
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out with objective to increase the firm’s market value and reduce the cost of new equity 
financing. The findings made above are in line with those made by Pajuste. Furthermore, 
the findings above are also more generally in line with the literature reviewed in chapter 2.    
As discussed in section 2, two key concepts for why shareholder value is being destroyed 
by dual-class share structures are increased principal-agent costs and private benefits 
gained by insiders. In light of this, a noteworthy point is that none of the companies that 
have unified their share classes have explicitly stated that the unification will reduce 
principal-agent costs or prevent insiders from gaining access to private benefits at the cost 
of holders of common shares. I assume that these are reasons that could highlight problems 
derived from dual-class share structures. However, reasons stating that the unification will 
clarify the ownership structure and increase investors' interest towards the company's share 
can be deemed, implicitly, to include statements on decreased principal-agent costs and 
private benefits.   
Finally, the fact that there have been several unifications of share classes on Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki during the 2000's (and prior to that as well), and many companies have explicitly 
stated that the possibility for using the company's shares in acquisition of financing has 
been a reason for the unification, supports Amoako-Adu & Smith's (2001) finding on dual-
class shares being temporary structures kept until the moment when the firm needs new 
equity capital for further expansion and growth.   
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
In this section, I aim to respond to the research questions presented in the introduction, 
namely: 
(i) Based on previous research, do dual-class share structures increase or destroy 
shareholder value? 
(ii) Under Finnish law, what are the practical consequences of having a dual-class 
share structure? 
(iii) Why have publicly listed companies in Finland chosen to create dual-class 
share structures? 
(iv) What common characteristics do publicly listed companies in Finland with 
dual-class share structures have? 
(v) Why have publicly listed companies in Finland chosen to unify their former 
dual-class share structures into a single class? 
First, based on previous research, even though dual-class share structures may have some 
benefits in certain specific cases, the bottom line is that such structures tend to increase 
principal-agent costs and private benefits of insiders, and consequently destroy shareholder 
value. Furthermore, dual-class share structures weaken, on average, the long-term 
performance of a company and institutional investors are avoiding companies which have 
more than one share class.  
Second, as discussed in chapter 3, developments in Finnish corporate law, which are 
strongly based on European Union legislation, and the increased focus on corporate 
governance, have reduced possibilities of controlling shareholders to gain benefits at the 
cost of minority shareholders. As recently as the 1990's, the Board of Directors was able to 
promote benefits of certain controlling shareholders. Nowadays every decision needs to be 
in accordance with corporate benefit. In light of this, the significance of share classes has 
diminished. However, under the Finnish Companies Act, a dual-class share structure is a 
very efficient anti-takeover mechanism.      
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Third, while analyzing reasons why some Finnish companies have chosen to carry out their 
IPOs with dual-class share structures, I found that none of these companies had given any 
justifications for such structures. In a way, dual-class share structures are taken as they are 
and are only flagged as risks in the risk sections of prospectuses. Perhaps, in the future, as 
investors will become more sophisticated, they will require well-grounded justifications for 
dual-class share structures. 
Fourth, when running a binary choice regression analysis of Finnish publicly listed 
companies, I found that there is a statistically significant and positive correlation between a 
dual class share structure and the size of a company and existence of anti-takeover 
provisions in the Articles of Association of a company. These findings are against 
corporate financing theory, as larger companies and companies already having an anti-
takeover mechanism in their Articles of Association should already be protected against 
hostile takeovers. On the other hand, large Finnish listed companies are relatively small on 
an international scale, and therefore the size does not protect them against global private 
equity or industrial players.  
In addition, companies operating in the health care industry or providing consumer goods 
tend to have two share classes more often than other companies. In contrast, technology 
companies tend to have a dual-class share structure more seldom than companies operating 
in other businesses. This can be considered as surprising in light of the current 
international practice, discussed in chapter 1 above. Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that companies which have been longer subject to public trading have more often a dual-
class share structure (not a statistically significant finding).   
Finally, when analyzing public statements of companies that have chosen to unify their 
dual-class share structure into a single-class structure, I found that such companies have 
emphasized that the unification will clarify the ownership structure, increase public interest 
towards the company's share and improve the liquidity of shares. It was stated that the 
unification is beneficial in order for a company to raise equity financing from investors. 
All of the aforementioned reasons can be considered to be in line with findings made in 
previous research, presented in chapter 2 above.   
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To summarize the findings of this paper:  
(i) There is not enough evidence for reasons why dual-class share structures are 
adopted.  
(ii) Developments in company law have changed practical implications of dual-
class share structures during recent decades.   
(iii) Large companies that have also other anti-takeover mechanisms in their 
Articles of Association, have been listed for a long time and operate in the 
health care and consumer goods sectors, are more likely to have dual-class 
share structures. 
(iv) Unifications are based on an attempt to increase interest from investors and 
enable equity financing, improve the liquidity of the shares and clarify the 
ownership structure. 
(v) Based on the literature review, the only good reasons to adopt a dual-class share 
structure today are insider control over business decisions in certain specific 
cases and a willingness to adopt anti-takeover measures. Otherwise a 
disproportional structure results in long-term loss of shareholder value and 
increased principal-agent problems. 
5.2 Practical Implications 
When considering the practicality of dual class share structures, a noteworthy point is that 
most of the dual-class share structures of Finnish listed companies have been adopted prior 
to corporate scandals in the early 2000's. The world today is quite different compared to a 
few decades ago. During recent decades, corporate governance standards have improved 
and a general attitude towards dual-class share structures has become more negative. In 
light of this, even though a choice to create a dual-class share structure may have been 
rational when the choice was made, retaining such a structure is most likely not rational 
anymore.  
Dual-class share structures have also been seen as a way of transitioning from a private 
company to a public company, and are therefore usually seen as temporary structures. 
However, there is some evidence that companies listed a long time ago tend to have a dual-
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class share structure more commonly. Furthermore, it appears that larger companies and 
companies with other anti-takeover provisions tend to have dual-class share structures 
more commonly as well, which may not be logical. It may be that many of the dual-class 
share structures of Finnish listed companies are not optimal at present.  
In my opinion, Finnish publicly listed companies with dual-class share structures should 
carefully consider whether possible private benefits derived from a dual-class share 
structure are more valuable than the financial loss brought by such a structure. A possible 
reason for why share classes have not been unified, at least in some cases, is that it is 
always easier to keep a status quo than break it. As Voltaire once said about status quo:  
"One day everything will be well, that is our hope. Everything's fine today; 
that is our illusion."  
When considering the fact that a dual-class share structure is an efficient anti-takeover 
measure, one could ask if it is in the shareholders' interest to protect the management of the 
company against hostile takeovers.  
Even though it is not required under the Prospectus Decree, companies choosing to carry 
out their IPO with a dual-class equity structure in Finland should consider giving some 
reasons for the choice in the prospectus. This would certainly increase the transparency of 
the chosen structure and would likely improve investors' confidence in the company. 
Furthermore, this would probably decrease the dual-class discount of the company, at least 
if the special circumstances were to be communicated skillfully to the market.    
5.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are a few limitations that should be considered when reviewing the applicability of 
this study to other research papers.   
First, the number of Finnish listed companies is relatively small for statistically significant 
results. For example, there are only a few media companies listed on the Nasdaq Helsinki 
OMX, which makes it impossible to draw statistically significant conclusions on whether 
media companies have dual-class share structures more often than other companies in 
Finland. To mitigate the problem of a small sample in the whole study, the sample could 
have been extended to include companies in other Nordic countries as well. However, not 
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all of the Nordic countries are similar, e.g., the Finnish capital market was a local market 
still in the 1980's. The extension of the data could have an effect on the result.  
Second, according to previous research, situations in which the advantages of dual-class 
share structures are realized are quite specific. Unfortunately, the dataset's lack of 
qualitative data on the firms’ specific situations prevents a firm specific analysis.  
Third, when analyzing public announcements of companies, it may be that the true motives 
behind creating and unifying dual-class share structures remain undisclosed, and general 
messages in accordance with the market practice are released instead. It is common 
practice in the arena of corporate legal documents to draft releases according to established 
market practice. This can only be researched by qualitative interviews aiming to uncover 
true motives. 
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research  
It appears that due to dual-class share structures, shareholder value is destroyed in the 
Finnish market. The question of, "How much money is left on the table?" remains 
unanswered. Therefore, an interesting research question would be to analyze the effect of 
disproportional ownership structures, including dual-class share structures, on firm values 
in Finland. Nevertheless, given the limited amount of Finnish publicly listed companies, it 
may be impossible to make statistically significant findings.  
To analyze the questions set out in this paper deeper, extensive interviews could be carried 
out in which CFOs of the companies with dual-class share structures are interviewed. 
However, a possible difficulty in this approach is that CEOs would not easily disclose 
anything that has not been publicly disclosed by the company.    
As dual-class share structures were even more common in the past and as such structures 
effectively prevent hostile takeovers, one interesting research area would be to analyze 
takeovers in which the target company has had a dual-class share structure. More specific 
topics could be, for example, to study whether a dual-class share structure has an effect on 
a premium paid in takeover or a completion probability of the offer.   
One current, however more specific, topic would be analyzing hybrid loans from the 
corporate governance perspective. It appears that such loans are particularly common in 
controlled companies which have a dual-class share structure. During recent years, hybrid 
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loans, which have high interest rates and no securities, have become increasingly popular 
within Finnish publicly listed companies. It also appears that such loans are usually 
directed to parties that are somehow connected with insiders of the issuing company. In 
light of this an interesting question would be whether hybrid loans generate private 
benefits, and thus, destroy shareholder value – and more generally, are hybrid loans in line 
with good corporate governance practices.    
Finally, let us hope that the IPO window will stay open and a positive IPO flow in Finland 
will continue so that we will get more listed companies on Nasdaq OMX Helsinki which 
would further possibilities to make statistically significant findings on, inter alia, the topics 
defined above.    
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